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In 2005, the Federal Court of Appeal had the opportunity to consider the rela-
tionship between notions of privacy and conceptions of intellectual property in
BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe.2 Justice Sexton, for the court, wrote:
Modern technology…must not be allowed to obliterate those personal property
rights which society has deemed important. Although privacy concerns must also be
considered, it seems to me that they must yield to public concerns for the protection
of intellectual property rights in situations where infringement threatens to erode
those rights.3
In the context of exploring the issues that were before the Court of Appeal in
that case, this chapter will explore three themes emanating from this para-
graph. First, Justice Sexton equates intellectual property with property rights
– an increasingly prevalent rhetoric in an age when property rights holders
who have come into the ascendancy during the industrial age are challenged
by the recent migration of wealth from manufacturing to the internet, from the
industrial age to the information age. Second, Justice Sexton juxtaposes
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1 The author has been supported in this work through funding received from the
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Law student Vanessa
Bacher provided timely research assistance. The author would also like to thank the
reviewer of an earlier draft of this paper for most thoughtful suggestions.
2 BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe, [2005] 4 F.C.R. 81, (2005), 39 C.P.R. (4th)
97, Sexton J.A. [BMG FCA cited to F.C.R.], aff’g BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe,
[2004] 3 F.C.R. 241, (2004), 32 C.P.R. (4th) 64, von Finckenstein J. [BMG FC cited to
F.C.R.].
3 Ibid. at para. 41.
privacy and intellectual property – and gives priority to intellectual property.
Third, Justice Sexton cites ‘public concerns for the protection of intellectual
property rights’ and this begs an examination of notions of the public interest.
It is perhaps not unexpected that a dispute such as this would arise from the
present highly charged environment of music. Music is an area where indus-
trial players have, in the past, particularly benefited from past extensions of
copyright law. In the immediate past, the music industry is also one that has
enjoyed considerable success, particularly in the US, in influencing legislators
to further amend copyright legislation to perpetuate and shore up the industrial
model.4 In Canada, the music industry has a long history of collective repre-
sentation,5 recently strengthened by further legislative recognition of collec-
tives for all rights holders.6 In this litigation, the music companies themselves
were the plaintiffs: BMG is just the first named plaintiff – the other plaintiffs
are fellow members of the Canadian Recording Industry Association (CRIA).7
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4 See Pamela Samuelson, ‘Digital Rights Management {and, or, vs.} the Law’
(April 2003) 46:4 Communications of the ACM 41. Samuelson writes that the
Hollywood industry has long influenced copyright policy in the United States, using
such measures as the Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA) of 1992, which required the
installation of copy management chips in digital audiotape technologies and videocas-
settes, and today through their ownership of key patents for DVD players, thus control-
ling the anti-copying technology built into them. They also have a mandate to increase
the prevalence of Digital Rights Management technology in their products. For further
illustration of the recording industry’s influence, see Amy Harmon ‘Music Industry in
Global Fight on Web Copies’ The New York Times (7 October 2002), online: New York
Times <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/07/technology/07SWAP.html> (on legal
action taken over file-sharing programs in the US). See also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios Inc. et al. v. Grokster, Ltd. et al., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) at para 1, where the
Supreme Court ruled against file-sharing software providers, concluding: ‘one who
distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown
by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for
the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.’
5 Dating back to 1925 when the Canadian Performing Rights Society, an
offshoot of the British Performing Rights Society, was established. In 1940, BMI
Canada emerged.
6 In 1988 the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42 [Copyright Act]
was amended to except rightholders’ collectives from the rigours of the Competition
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34. This encouraged the formation of many rightsholders’
collectives. See Mario Bouchard, ‘Collective Management in Commonwealth
Jurisdictions: Comparing Canada and Australia’ in Daniel Gervais, ed., Collective
Management of Copyright and Related Rights (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law
International, 2006) 283 at 285.
7 EMI Music Canada, a Division of EMI Group Canada Inc., Sony Music
Entertainment (Canada) Inc., Universal Music Canada Inc., Warner Music Canada
Ltd., BMG Music, Arista Records Inc., Zomba Recording Corporation, EMI Music
Sweden AB, Capitol Records, Inc., Chrysalis Records Limited, Virgin Records
 
CRIA is not a copyright collective:8 rather it is ‘a non-profit trade organization
that was founded in 1964 to represent the interests of Canadian companies that
create, manufacture and market sound recordings’,9 although it maintains ‘a
Division to enforce the various rights in copyright of its members and to inves-
tigate and initiate legal action in response to piracy’.10 Further, ‘[i]n associa-
tion with its international affiliates, CRIA’s Anti-Piracy Division monitors
internet sites in Canada for unauthorized use of sound recordings’.11 Unlike
the practice of many copyright collective associations,12 CRIA does not take
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Limited, Sony Music Entertainment Inc., Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Inc., UMG
Recordings, Inc., Mercury Records Limited, and WEA International Inc.
8 In the 1988 reforms, copyright holder collectives were exempted from the
rigours of the Competition Act. See Copyright Act, supra note 6, s. 70.5. For an
interesting discussing of the situation of users’ collectives, as opposed to copyright
holders’ collectives, see Catherine A. Maskell, ‘Consortia: Anti-competitive or in
the public good?’ (2008) 26:2 Library Hi-Tech 164. The definition of ‘collective
society’ was added to the Canadian Copyright Act in 1997 by S.C. 1997, c.24,
s. 1(5):
a society, association or corporation that carries on the business of collective admin-
istration of copyright or of the remuneration right conferred by section 19 [re: rights
in sound recordings] or 81 [re: private copying of sound recordings] for the benefit
of those who, by assignment, grant of license, appointment of it as their agent or
otherwise, authorize it to act on their behalf in relation to that collective adminis-
tration, and
(a) operates a licensing scheme, applicable in relation to a repertoire of works...or
more than one author ... pursuant to which the society, association or corporation
sets out classes of users that it agrees to authorize under this Act, and the royalties
and terms and conditions on which it agrees to authorize those classes of users, or
(b) carries on the business of collecting and distributing royalties, or levies payable
pursuant to this Act.
CRIA is not included in the compendium of Canadian collective societies available on
the website of the Copyright Board of Canada, Copyright Board of Canada, ‘Copyright
Collective Societies’, online: <http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/societies/index-e.html>.
9 Canadian Recording Industry Association, ‘About CRIA’, online:
<http://www.cria.ca/about.php>.
10 See #1 in CRIA’s list of anti-piracy efforts: CRIA, ‘What we do?’, online:
<http://www.cria.ca/whatwedo.php>. Also see Jonathan Fowlie ‘Music police trumpet
piracy bust’ The Globe & Mail (9 July 2004) A1, A10. On Thursday 8 July 2004, the
RCMP announced that, tipped off by the CRIA, they had confiscated an enormous
cache of over 1,100 DVDs and 1,500 VHS tapes, ‘the most ever taken at one time,’
bootlegged from music concerts and shows. An individual from Hamilton was charged
with five counts of copyright infringement. On the following Monday, 12 July 2004,
the members of CRIA filed their appeal from the decision of Justice von Finckenstein.
11 See #6 in CRIA’s list of anti-piracy efforts, ibid..
12 The Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada
an assignment from its members of the copyright interest it represents and thus
is not directly a litigant in proceedings such as this case.
CRIA’s members, then, launched this lawsuit against ‘John Doe, Jane Doe
and all those persons who are infringing copyright in the plaintiffs’ sound
recordings’. In particular,13 the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were
infringing their rights:
• To reproduce sound recordings in a material form14
• To authorize the reproduction of sound recordings in a material form15
The infringements alleged were both primary infringement16 and, by distrib-
uting (to such an extent as to affect prejudicially the owner of copyright) unau-
thorized reproductions and possessing the unauthorized reproductions in order
to effect the distribution, secondary infringement.17
The challenge facing the plaintiffs as they commenced this litigation in the
Federal Court was inherent in the technology of the internet: although they
knew that works in which they held copyright interests were circulating
widely on the internet without their permission, they did not know the identi-
ties of those whom they alleged were infringing their rights to reproduce or
authorize reproduction. They alleged that activity at 29 internet service
provider addresses was evidence of infringement.18 However, all 29 addresses
could be identified by the plaintiffs only in terms of the online pseudonyms
that the internet users at those addresses used. Thus the plaintiffs brought the
interlocutory motion, which created the context for the judgments on which
this article focuses. The motion was brought before Justice von Finckenstein
under Federal Court Rules 23319 and 238,20 against five Canadian internet
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(SOCAN), for example, takes an assignment from its members of performing rights in
music, including rights to communicate music by telecommunication, and therefore, in
litigation proceedings, SOCAN is itself a party.
13 BMG FC, supra note 2 at para. 22.
14 Copyright Act, supra note 6, s. 18(1)(b).
15 Ibid. at s. 18(1).
16 Ibid. at s. 27(1).
17 Ibid. at s. 27 (2)(b), (d). This is a relatively new section of the Act, added in
1997.
18 BMG FC, supra note 2 at para. 3. The plaintiffs submitted that over 1000
songs had been downloaded by users at each of these 29 internet addresses.
19 Federal Court Rules, S.O.R./98-106, r. 233 (1). On motion, the Court may order
the production of any document that is in the possession of a person who is not a party to
the action, if the document is relevant and its production could be compelled at trial.
20 Ibid. at r. 238 (1). A party to an action may bring a motion for leave to exam-
ine for discovery any person not a party to the action, other than an expert witness for
a party, who might have information on an issue in the action.
service providers21 to compel these ISPs to disclose the names of their
customers who used the ISP addresses alleged to be relevant to the infringe-
ment lawsuit.22 It is important to note that all parties to this motion agreed on
two points:
[1.] ISP account holders have an expectation that their identity will be kept private
and confidential. This expectation of privacy is based on both the terms of their
account agreements with the ISPs and sections 3 and 5 of the Personal Information
Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA).
[2.] The exceptions contained in PIPEDA apply in this case and an ISP by virtue of
s. 7(3)(c) of PIPEDA may disclose personal information without consent pursuant
to a court order.23
In the first instance, Justice von Finckenstein decided that the test that he
ought to apply, in deciding whether to grant the applicants’ motion,24 had the
following five parts:25
(a) the applicant must establish a prima facie case against the unknown
alleged wrongdoer;
(b) the person from whom discovery is sought must be in some way
involved in the matter under dispute, he must be more than an innocent
bystander;
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21 Shaw Communications Inc., Roger Cable Communications Inc., Bell Canada,
Telus Inc., and Vidéotron Ltée.
22 BMG FC, supra note 2 at para. 6. Electronic Frontier Canada and the newly
established Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic of the Faculty of Law
at the University of Ottawa (CIPPIC) were granted intervener status for the purpose of
making arguments.
23 Ibid. at para. 9.
24 Ibid. at para. 15.
25 Ibid. at para. 13. See also Federal Court Rules, supra note 19, r. 238(3) set out
in Annex A to the judgment:
The Court may, on a motion under subsection (1) [set out above], grant leave to
examine a person and determine the time and manner of conducting the examina-
tion, if it is satisfied that
(a) the person may have information on an issue in the action;
(b) the party has been unable to obtain the information informally from the person
or from another source by any other reasonable means;
(c) it would be unfair not to allow the party an opportunity to question the person
before trial; and
(d) the questioning will not cause undue delay, inconvenience or expense to the
person or to the other parties.
(c) the person from whom discovery is sought must be the only practical
source of information available to the applicants;
(d) the person from whom discovery is sought must be reasonably compen-
sated for his expenses arising out of compliance with the discovery order
in addition to his legal costs;
(e) the public interests in favour of disclosure must outweigh the legitimate
privacy concerns.
Of these criteria, Justice von Finckenstein found that the applicant plaintiffs
had satisfied (b),26 (d),27 but not (a),28 (c),29 or (e).30 Therefore, he denied the
motion.31
The plaintiff applicants appealed the denial of their motion to the Federal
Court of Appeal. Justice Sexton, as mentioned above, delivered the judgment
for himself, Justice Noël and Chief Justice Richard.32 The Court of Appeal
itself characterized the outcome of the appeal as one of ‘divided success’33 –
however, the appeal was dismissed.34 The characterization of ‘divided
success’ was made because this dismissal was ‘without prejudice to the plain-
tiffs’ right to commence a further application for disclosure of the identity of
the “users” taking into account these reasons’.35
The Court of Appeal upheld Justice von Finckenstein’s view that Rule 233
of the Federal Court was not available to the plaintiffs on these facts.36 The
Court of Appeal agreed that Justice von Finckenstein had used the appropriate
five criteria to determine the outcome of the motion with respect to Rule
238.37 The Court of Appeal also agreed in the result with Justice von
Finckenstein’s finding that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie
case against the unknown alleged wrongdoer.38 However, the Court of Appeal,
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26 Ibid. at para. 30.
27 Ibid. at para. 35.
28 Ibid. at para. 43.
29 Ibid. at paras. 31, 43.
30 Ibid. at paras. 42–3.
31 Ibid. at para. 47. In obiter in paras. 44–6, Justice von Finckenstein described
the scope and terms of the order he would have given had the motion succeeded.
32 Only CIPPIC intervened in the case at this level.
33 BMG FCA, supra note 2 at para. 56.
34 Ibid. at para. 55.
35 Ibid. at paras. 55, 56. All parties had to bear their own costs of the appeal.
36 Ibid. at paras. 17–19.
37 Ibid. at para. 30, Sexton J. ‘In my view, the plaintiffs could invoke either Rule
238 or equitable bills of discovery and, in either case, the legal principles relating to
equitable bills of discovery would be applicable’, this agreement was subject to a
caveat concerning the first branch of the test, which will be set out just below.
38 Ibid. at para. 21.
in agreeing that this motion should be denied, focussed on the deficiencies in
the evidence presented in this proceeding, which was primarily hearsay:39 the
Court of Appeal, on the other hand, confirmed that it is possible to bring a
motion to compel identification of persons committing infringements of copy-
right under Rule 238.40 Moreover, the Court of Appeal disagreed with Justice
von Finckenstein’s statement of the first branch of the test, that, to succeed on
such a motion, the plaintiffs had to provide evidence of a prima facie case,41
and stated that the correct test was whether the plaintiffs had a bona fide
claim.42 It would have been sufficient, therefore, in the eyes of the Court of
Appeal, if the plaintiffs had been able to establish, on this branch of the five
part test, that ‘they really do intend to bring an action for infringement of
copyright based upon the information they obtain, and that there is no other
improper purpose for seeking the identity of these persons’.43
The Court of Appeal specifically agreed with Justice von Finckenstein’s
‘characterization of the 5th criteria – that is – the public interest in favour of
disclosure must outweigh the legitimate privacy concerns of the person sought
to be identified if a disclosure order is made’.44 Justice von Finckenstein had
written that:
This motion is not a novel proceeding. In the past, third parties have been compelled
to disclose documents identifying the name and address of a defendant previously
identified solely by an Internet Protocol address. In no case have privacy or other
concerns weighing against disclosure outweighed the interest in obtaining docu-
ments and information necessary to identify the defendants [authorities omitted].
In this case, the plaintiffs have a legitimate copyright in their works and are enti-
tled to protect it against infringement...45
In the same vein, Justice Sexton, for the Court of Appeal, held ‘in my view, in
cases where plaintiffs show that they have a bona fide claim that unknown
persons are infringing their copyright, they have a right to have the identity
revealed for the purpose of bringing action’.46 Justice von Finckenstein in the
first instance found, that despite the plaintiffs’ legitimate interests in protecting
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39 Ibid..
40 Ibid. at para. 25.
41 BMG FC, supra note 2 at paras. 13, 43. See the language of Von Finckenstein
J. referring to ‘a prima facie case.’
42 BMG FCA, supra note 2 at para. 32.
43 Ibid. at paras. 34, 54. FCA judgment specifically did not accept Justice von
Finckenstein’s statements of copyright law and findings relating to the merits of the
claim for infringement.
44 Ibid. at para. 36.
45 BMG FC, supra note 2 at paras. 41–2.
46 BMG FCA, supra note 2 at para. 42.
themselves against infringers, they had left too long a period of time between
the alleged infringements and their quest for the infringers’ identities and that
this gap raised ‘the serious possibility of an innocent account holder being
identified’.47 Justice Sexton, for the Court of Appeal, was also concerned
about delay – and for the same reasons:
it is possible that the privacy rights of innocent persons would be infringed and legal
proceedings against such persons would be without justification. Thus the greatest
care should be taken to avoid delay between the investigation and the request for
information. Failure to take such care might well justify a court in refusing to make
a disclosure order.48
Justice Sexton went on to say:
In any event, if a disclosure order is granted, specific directions should be given as
to the type of information disclosed and the manner in which it can be used. In addi-
tion, it must be said that where there exists evidence of copyright infringement,
privacy concerns may be met if the court orders that the user only be identified by
initials, or makes a confidentiality order.49
Thus, at the end of the day, much of what the Court of Appeal in BMG Canada
Inc. v. John Doe says about privacy and personal data protection is obiter – just
as the decision of the original motions judge, Justice von Finckenstein, did not
depend upon his findings about the relationship between the plaintiffs’ intel-
lectual property rights and the privacy or personal data protection interests of
the owners of the targeted internet accounts. Nonetheless, and notwithstanding
the fact that there are other decisions which have involved disclosure of iden-
tities in litigation involving the internet, both Justice von Finckenstein and the
Federal Court of Appeal express in this case attitudes toward the relationship
between privacy and personal data protection interests and intellectual prop-
erty interests that bear close scrutiny.
This scrutiny is particularly warranted in light of the comments made by
Justice LeBel, dissenting in part, in Society of Composers, Authors and Music
Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Association of Internet Providers.50 This
decision, also involving music in the internet environment, was released on 30
June 2004,51 between the time that Justice von Finckenstein gave his judgment
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47 BMG FC, supra note 2 at para. 42.
48 BMG FCA, supra note 2 at para. 43.
49 Ibid. at para. 45.
50 Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian
Assn. of Internet Providers, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427, Binnie J. [Tariff 22].
51 The majority decision was written by Justice Binnie, for himself and Justices
Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Arbour, Deschamps, Fish and Chief Justice McLachlin.
 
in BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe, on 31 March 2004, and the judgment of the
Court of Appeal on 19 May 2005, and was not referred to by the Court of
Appeal. In the Tariff 22 decision, Justice LeBel writes
...In general, once the content provider has posted content on a host server, it is
available to the public. Owners of copyright works and their collective societies can
easily monitor such public content by trawling the publicly accessible servers with
specially designed software. Privacy concerns are diminished because it is the
content provider who has made the information public by posting it on the server.
Although privacy concerns are attenuated, they are not eliminated [by the approach
he was proposing in the Tariff 22 case]. It is now common for Internet site opera-
tors to collect personal data from end users when users visit their Web site...But that
is a question for another day.52
That ‘other day’, forecast by Justice LeBel, was indeed before the courts in
BMG v. John Doe, but Justice LeBel gave an indication of his perspective in
such a case when, as the only member of the Supreme Court to raise privacy
issues in Tariff 22, he warned:
By contrast, the real and substantial connection test [the test adopted by the major-
ity in the Tariff 22 decision], insofar as it looks at the retrieval practices of end users,
encourages the monitoring of an individual’s surfing and downloading activities.
Such habits tend to reveal core biographical information about a person. Privacy
interests of individuals will be directly implicated where owners of copyrighted
works or their collective societies attempt to retrieve data from Internet Service
Providers about an end user’s downloading of copyrighted works. We should there-
fore be wary of adopting a test that may encourage such monitoring.53
The industry and environment concerned are identical in the two cases. The
Supreme Court, in Tariff 22, noted ‘[t]he issue of the proper balance in matters
of copyright plays out against the much larger conundrum of trying to apply
national laws to a fast-evolving technology that in essence respects no national
boundaries’.54 The Tariff 22 litigation concerned ‘the difficult issue of who
should compensate musical composers and artists for their Canadian copyright
in music downloaded in Canada from a foreign country via the Internet’.55 In
BMG v. John Doe, participants in the music industry were also trying to
enforce their rights in the internet environment, seeking compensation for
music. As in the interim motion proceedings involved in BMG v. John Doe, the
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52 Tariff 22, supra note 50 at para. 154, LeBel J., dissenting.
53 Ibid. at paras. 153–155, LeBel J., dissenting.
54 Ibid. at para. 41.
55 Ibid. at para. 1.
targets in the Tariff 22 litigation were the internet service providers (ISPs).56
In the Tariff 22 situation, the root of the litigation lay in the factual reality that
‘[a]t this point the prospect of seeking to collect royalties from foreign
infringers is not an attractive prospect for SOCAN’57 – and therefore SOCAN
sought (unsuccessfully, in the end) to obtain revenue by imposing tariff oblig-
ations on Canadian ISPs. The root of the BMG v. John Doe litigation lies in the
fact that ‘Canada’s music producers and recording industry are very concerned
about infringement of copyright in their musical works through the use of
Internet file sharing’ and they did not have access to the identities of the
alleged infringers; but the ISPs did.58
In finding that Canadian ISPs could not be made subject to the tariff at issue
before them in the Tariff 22 case, the Supreme Court observed:
The knowledge that someone might be using neutral technology to violate copy-
right...is not necessarily sufficient to constitute authorization...An overly quick
inference of ‘authorization’ would put the Internet Service Provider in the difficult
position of judging whether the copyright objection is well founded, and to choose
between contesting a copyright action or potentially breaching its contract with the
content provider.59
The Court went on to observe:60
Parliament made a policy distinction between those who abuse the Internet to obtain
‘cheap music’ and those who are part of the infrastructure of the Internet itself. It is
clear that Parliament did not want copyright disputes between creators and users to
be visited on the heads of Internet intermediaries, whose continued expansion and
development is considered vital to national economic growth.61
Moreoever, Justice LeBel, concurring with the majority on this part of the
judgment, but alone in specifically raising privacy concerns, stated:
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56 In the Tariff 22 context, the ISPs were the targets of the action itself: the liti-
gation before the Supreme Court of Canada was an interim proceeding taken to deter-
mine whether the Copyright Board of Canada had jurisdiction to impose a tariff for the
benefit of SOCAN on Canadian ISPs.
57 Tariff 22, supra note 50 at para. 81.
58 BMG FCA, supra note 2 at para 2.
59 Tariff 22, supra note 50 at para. 127 (Binnie, J. for the majority of the Court,
LeBel, J., concurring in these areas).
60 In the context of s. 2.4(1)(b) of the Copyright Act which was at issue in the
case.
61 Tariff 22, supra note 50 at para. 131 (Binnie, J. for the majority of the Court,
LeBel, J., concurring in these areas).
Insofar as is possible, this Court should adopt an interpretation of [the section at
issue] that respects end users’ privacy interests, and should eschew an interpretation
that would encourage the monitoring or collection of personal data gleaned from
Internet-related activity within the home…
The attitudes of both the majority62 and minority in Tariff 22 may be
contrasted with the attitudes of both Justice von Finckenstein and the Federal
Court of Appeal in BMG v. John Doe, expressed most forcefully in the judg-
ment of Justice Sexton: ‘in my view, in cases where plaintiffs show that they
have a bona fide claim that unknown persons are infringing their copyright,
they have a right to have the identity revealed [by ISPs] for the purpose of
bringing action [emphasis here added]’.63 Indeed, by lowering the requirement
on the first branch of the test from establishing a bona fide case (Justice von
Finckenstein’s threshold) to establishing a bone fide claim, the Court of
Appeal gave even greater priority to intellectual property rights (and other
civil claims) over privacy interests – with the result that ISPs, whatever their
contractual obligations to their clients, would be more frequently required to
reveal their clients’ identities in civil proceedings brought by third parties.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PROPERTY
What is the nature of the interests that are declared by Justice Sexton to be
competing for priority in society? He discusses intellectual property and prop-
erty and he also describes both ‘privacy concerns’64 and ‘public concerns for
the protection of intellectual property rights’.65
It may be useful to begin first by setting aside the equation of intellectual
property and property articulated by Justice Sexton. Copyright is intellectual
property, not property.66 Mis-characterizing its essential nature will not assist
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62 The majority was particularly leery of imposing obligations on ISPs (ibid.).
The precedent created by the Federal Court of Appeal in BMG v. John Doe, if correct,
can impose obligations on ISPs and does directly affect the ability of ISPs to guaran-
tee confidentiality to their clients.
63 BMG FCA, supra note 2 at para. 42.
64 Ibid. (See also the opening quotation in this chapter.)
65 Ibid.
66 See, for example, W.A. Adams, ‘Personal Property Law and Information
Assets: Rehabilitation and Relevance,’ (2002) 36 Canadian Business Law Journal 267.
This perspective may be perceived to run counter to the argument made by Norman
Siebrasse that, rather than attempting to balance dissemination and the incentive to
create works through copyright law, copyright law should focus on ensuring that prop-
erty rights are clearly defined: Norman Siebrasse, ‘A Property Rights Theory of the
Limits of Copyright’ (2001) 51 University of Toronto Law Journal 1. On the other
 
with the resolving of the important questions facing lawmakers.67 Daniel Gervais
has recently pointed out that there are both economic and instrumentalist justifi-
cations for copyright and rights-based justifications for copyright made – but
‘[t]rying to squeeze copyright on one side of that philosophical fence is incorrect
in historical perspective, both in common law and civil law jurisdictions’.68
It has been widely acknowledged that copyright, in its current form in
Canada, is a purely statutory system.69 Further, in s. 3 of the Canadian
Copyright Act, it is made absolutely clear that rights exist for rights holders
only in the whole or a substantial portion of works. Authors, therefore, do not
have an exclusive or exclusionary right over their works – only rights over
substantial portions or whole dealings with their works. Where insubstantial
portions of their works are involved, authors and copyright holders have no
interest.70 Moreover, the holders of economic rights in copyright under
Canadian law are only compensated if they have a right that would, without
their consent, be infringed:
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hand, his need to make the argument itself demonstrates that copyright, as a branch of
intellectual property, cannot be considered pure property. See R.J. Roberts, ‘Canadian
Copyright: Natural Property or Mere Monopoly’ (1979) 40 C.P.R. (2d) 33; Compo Co.
v. Blue Crest Music Inc., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 357 at 373, Estey J.; Bishop v. Stevens, [1990]
2 S.C.R. 467 at 477.
67 It should be noted that there have been calls to create a property right in
personal data. For example, James Rule and Lawrence Hunter, ‘Towards Property
Rights in Personal Data’ in Colin J. Bennett & Rebecca Grant, eds., Visions of Privacy:
Policy Choices for the Digital Age (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) 168. It
should also be noted that the authors do not discuss the relationship between this
proposed property interest and existing interests in intellectual property.
68 Daniel Gervais, ‘The Changing Role of Copyright Collectives’ in Daniel
Gervais, ed., Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights (The
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2006) 3 at 6.
69 As Plowman J. writes in Universities of Oxford and Cambridge v. Eyre &
Spottiswoode Ltd., [1964] 1 Ch 736 at 750, [1963] 3 All E.R. 289 at 293, ‘until 1709
[the Statute of Anne] private copyright did not exist.’ And, explicitly, in 1911, the
Imperial Copyright Act abolished any common law copyright: s. 31. This provision is
carried forward in s. 89 of the current Canadian Copyright Act.
70 A point recognized by the Copyright Board in Application by Pointe-à-
Callière, Montreal Museum of Archeology and History for the Reproduction of
Quotations (29 March 2004), Copyright Board Decision, online: <http://www.cb-
cda.gc.ca/unlocatable/other/1-b.pdf>, when the Board declined to give applicants
licenses for unlocatable copyright holders that they were seeking because the Board
found the use being contemplated was not one over which the copyright holders had
rights. CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339 at
para. 56 [CCH], ‘if the amount taken from a work is trivial, the fair dealing analysis
need not be undertaken at all because the court will have concluded that there was no
copyright infringement’ because, under s. 3, ‘copyright subsists in every work or every
substantial portion…’.
It is an infringement of copyright for any person to do, without the consent of the
owner of the copyright, anything that by this Act only the owner of the [economic]
copyright has the right to do.71
This is far from vesting a property right in works. Indeed the Canadian
Copyright Act embraces three independent sets of rights. Two of these systems
of rights take the form of limited term monopolies72 emanating from the
creation of works: the economic rights in copyright and the moral rights in
copyright. The moral rights are inalienable interests held by the creators of
works.73 The third set of rights is based on particular uses of information: this
third set is the users’ rights. The fair dealing exceptions under the Canadian
Copyright Act are the cornerstone of this set of rights.74 As the Chief Justice
expressed it, for a unanimous Supreme Court,
User rights are not just loopholes. Both owner rights and user rights should there-
fore be given the fair and balanced reading that befits remedial legislation.75
It is true that the Supreme Court has recently considered the role of licenses
in the context of the Copyright Act and specifically approved the following
explanation of the relationship between rights and permissions under the Act:
The ‘grant of an interest’ referred to in s. 13(4) [of the Copyright Act] is the trans-
fer of a property right as opposed to a permission to do a certain thing. The former
gives the licensee the capacity to sue in his own name for infringement, the latter
provides only a defence to claims of infringement.76
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71 Copyright Act, supra note 6, s. 27(1).
72 Ibid. at s. 6. (Both sets of rights run for the life of the author plus approxi-
mately fifty years).
73 Ibid. at ss. 2, 14.1, 14.2, 28.1 and 28.2. (These rights in Canada include the
rights to paternity and integrity as well as rights to determine with what the creator’s
work will be associated. While they can be waived, they cannot be assigned.)
74 Margaret Ann Wilkinson ‘Filtering the flow from the fountains of knowledge:
access and copyright in education and libraries’ in Michael Geist, ed., In the public
interest: the future of Canadian copyright law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) 331. (The
users’ rights language of the Supreme Court of Canada is strong, rights-based language
and offers a powerful alternative to the potential tyranny of rights holders’ interests
signalled by the mandatory language in the Berne Convention, NAFTA and TRIPS
agreements. The Government may wish to bear in mind that a strong connection may
be drawn between the rights-based language of the Supreme Court of Canada in this
area and the right to freedom of expression, including rights to access information,
under s. 2(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.)
75 CCH, supra note 70 at para. 48, quoting with approval from David Vaver,
Copyright Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2000) 171.
76 Robertson v. Thomson Corp., [2006] 2 S.C.R. 363 at para. 56, LeBel and Fish
JJ., for the majority (quoting Ritchie v. Sawmill Creek Golf & Country Club Ltd.
 
However, this statement is specifically made with reference to certain
economic rights granted under the Copyright Act. Failure to distinguish
between various uses of expressions of facts and ideas (information), which
are reserved to the holders of the economic rights in copyright under the
Canadian Copyright Act, and the works associated with these economic copy-
right interests, or the facts and ideas lying behind the expressions, will distort
the role and contribution of economic rights in copyright to society77 and
eclipse the contribution of both moral rights under the Canadian Copyright Act
and users’ rights under the Canadian Copyright Act, such as fair dealing.
A key feature of intellectual property is that these devices carry with them
aspects of public interest. In the Copyright Act, all three bundles of rights (the
economic, the moral and the users’) serve the public interest. Justice Binnie,
writing for the majority in Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain,
emphasized that the Copyright Act provides ‘a balance between promoting the
public interest in the encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts
and intellect and obtaining a just reward for the creator (or, more accurately,
to prevent someone other than the creator from appropriating whatever bene-
fits may be generated).’78 He went on to recognize the special – and limited –
nature of the economic copyright holders’ rights under copyright:
The proper balance…lies not only in recognizing the creator’s rights but in giving
due weight to their limited nature. In crassly economic terms, it would be as ineffi-
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(2004), 35 C.P.R. (4th) 163 (Ont. S.C.J.)). See also paras. 57–8 (the majority of the
Court further held that ‘the content of these licenses is a live issue that should go to
trial... Parties are, have been, and will continue to be, free to alter by contract the rights
established by the Copyright Act’).
77 To consider meeting the information needs in a society one must factor in
many who are not, and may never become, ‘authors’ within the meaning of the
Copyright Act – but who are nonetheless communicators of ideas and facts. Abraham
Drassinower has promulgated an interesting analysis, in various publications, that
essentially reduces copyright players to authors and non-authors: see Abraham
Drassinower, ‘A Rights-Based View of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright
Law’ (2003) 16 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 3. He has been unable to
extend his analysis to the patent arena (see Margaret Ann Wilkinson, ‘National
Treatment, National Interest and the Public Domain’ (2003–2004) 1:1-2 University of
Ottawa Journal of Technology Law 23) because not all non-patent holders can realisti-
cally be considered potential patent holders. That Drassinower cannot articulate his
theory for patents may in fact be because the patent situation more clearly points out
an essential weakness in the whole theory, even for the copyright context: not all non-
authors are potential authors – there is a class of non-authors who, nevertheless, are
important information users and disseminators.
78 Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336 at
para. 30 [Théberge] [italics added], Tariff 22, supra note 50 at para. 40. All but the ital-
icized section is also restated and approved in CCH, supra note 70 at para. 10.
cient to overcompensate artists…as it would be self-defeating to under-compensate
them…
Excessive control by holders of copyrights and other forms of intellectual prop-
erty may unduly limit the ability of the public domain to incorporate and embellish
creative innovation in the long-term interests of society as a whole, or create prac-
tical obstacles to proper utilization.79
The Chief Justice further expressed this concept in CCH v. Law Society of
Upper Canada: ‘the purpose of the copyright law was to balance the public
interest in promoting the encouragement and dissemination of works of the
arts and intellect and obtaining a just reward for the creator.’80
Thus equating intellectual property rights such as copyright with property
is not accurate, but perhaps more importantly, it does nothing to assist in the
resolution of problems involving competing legal interests and, indeed, leads
to mischaracterization of interests by obscuring such values as the encourage-
ment and dissemination of innovations and works of the art and intellect.
PRIVACY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Justice Sexton characterized the challenge before the court in BMG v. John
Doe as one requiring consideration of privacy rights in light of intellectual
property concerns – and gave intellectual property priority. However, in terms
of ‘privacy concerns’, two different ideas occur in BMG v. John Doe. First,
acknowledged in the agreement of the parties, are the statutory obligations
imposed upon the ISPs under the PIPEDA. Second are notions of privacy that
pre-date the coming into force of PIPEDA: ‘the legitimate privacy concerns’
referred to in the fifth branch of the test for granting equitable bills of discov-
ery and now declared by Justice Finckenstein, approved by the Court of
Appeal, applicable to applications under Rule 238 of the Federal Court.
Turning first to the statutory obligations, Justice von Finckenstein wrote his
judgment, released on 31 March 2004, just months after the Personal
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) came into
force in respect of businesses such as ISPs, on 1 January 2004.81 Indeed, up
until 2000, no such legislation existed at all in the private sector in Canada
(except in Quebec where the Act Respecting the Protection of Personal
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79 Théberge, ibid. at paras. 31–2.
80 CCH, supra note 70 at para. 23, McLachlin, C.J. (citing Théberge, supra note
78 at 335, Binnie J.).
81 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c.
5 [PIPEDA], discussed in BMG FC, supra note 2 at paras. 38–40.
Information in the Private Sector82 dates from 1993). The personal data
protection aspects of PIPEDA came into force for federally regulated busi-
nesses (for example, shipping companies) and any inter-provincial transfers of
information by Canadian businesses on 1 January 2001,83 except where the
information involved was personal health information,84 but, as mentioned, by
1 January 2004, all private sector organizations engaged in ‘commercial activ-
ities’ in Canada were included in the regime85 (including those dealing with
personal health information).86
Personal data protection is a statutory regime that has swept across Canada
since 1977, when it was first introduced into the public sector in Part IV of the
Canada Human Rights Act.87 It was later combined with the access to govern-
ment information initiative,88 becoming, in 1982, the federal Privacy Act89–
passed together with the federal Access to Information Act.90 Similar legisla-
tion was passed in Quebec in the same year.91 Combined access and personal
data protection legislation now governs the vast majority of public sector orga-
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82 Act Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector,
R.S.Q. c. P-39.1.
83 PIPEDA, supra note 81 at s. 30(1).
84 Ibid. at s. 30(1.1).
85 Ibid. at ss. 30(2), (2.1).
86 The federal government, for constitutional reasons, left room for, and indeed
encouraged, provincial regulation of private sector activities – and some provinces
have taken up this invitation. The federal legislation anticipates the passage of ‘equiv-
alent’ provincial legislation, by providing that, once recognized as equivalent by the
federal Cabinet, such provincial legislation will replace PIPEDA for provincial matters
within that province (PIPEDA, supra note 81 at s. 26(2)(b)). Quebec’s pre-existing Act
respecting the protection of personal information in the private sector, supra note 82
has already been recognized by the federal government as equivalent to PIPEDA.
Several other provinces have passed legislation for the private sector – but have not
succeeded in persuading the federal government that the legislation is equivalent to
PIPEDA (Alberta, Personal Information Protection Act, S.A. 2003, c. P-6.5 and British
Columbia, Personal Information Protection Act, S.B.C. 2003, c. 63.) – thus organiza-
tions in those provinces must satisfy both regimes. Several other provinces have passed
specific personal data protection legislation for the health sector. In Ontario’s case, this
legislation has been deemed equivalent to PIPEDA by the federal government. See, in
this connection: Wil Peekhaus, ‘Personal Medical Information: Privacy or Personal
Data Protection?’ (July 2006) 5:2 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology 87.
87 Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6.
88 In a unique move, the two separate statutes, now separately located and iden-
tified, were passed in one bill: Access to Information Act and Privacy Act, S.C. 1982,
c. 111.
89 Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21.
90 Access to Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1.
91 An act respecting access to documents held by public bodies and the
Protection of personal information, R.S.Q. c. A-2.1.
 
nizations.92 It must be noted, however, that personal data protection legislation
in the private sector is not combined with access legislation.
This difference between public and private sector personal data protection
legislation – that the former is invariably combined with access legislation but
the latter never is – becomes important in examining one precedent discussed
by both Justice Finckenstein and the Court of Appeal in BMG v. John Doe:
Glaxo Wellcome PLC v. Minister of National Revenue.93 At the time of the
Glaxo Wellcome case, Revenue Canada would indeed have been subject to
public sector personal data protection legislation.94 However, as noted, all
public sector institutions governed by personal data protection legislation are
also subject to access legislation95 and, indeed, the Glaxo Wellcome decision
stands for the proposition that a litigant seeking production of documents in
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92 There are arguably 14 jurisdictions in Canada: the federal government, nine
provinces and three territories (although technically territorial governments are subor-
dinate to the federal government). Municipalities are subordinate to the legislatures of
the provinces. In some provinces they are included in the personal data protection legis-
lation that governs provincial organizations (Alberta, British Columbia, Quebec and
Newfoundland) and in some cases provinces have passed separate legislation for them
(Ontario and Saskatchewan). In other jurisdictions municipalities per se are not
covered (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island). Thus the public
sector legislation in force is as follows: Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21 (Canada),
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. F-25 (Alberta),
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 165 (British
Columbia), the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.M. 1997, c.50
(Manitoba), Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.L. 2002, c. A-1.1
(Newfoundland and Labrador), Right to Information Act, S.N.B. 1978, c. R-10.3 (New
Brunswick), Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.S. 1993, c.5
(Nova Scotia), Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.
F.31 (Ontario), Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.P.E.I. 2001, c.
37 (Prince Edward Island), An Act Respecting Access to Documents Held By Public
Bodies and the Protection of Personal Information, supra note 91 (Quebec), Freedom
of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.S. 1990–91, c. F-22.01
(Saskatchewan), Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.W.T. 1994,
c. 20 (Nunavut & Northwest Territories), Access to Information and Protection of
Privacy Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 1 (Yukon), Municipal Freedom of Information and
Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M56 (Ontario), Local Authority Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.S. 1990–91, c. L-27.1 (Saskatchewan). It
also must be noted that in four provinces public health information has been moved to
separate legislation: Health Information Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. H-5 (Alberta), Personal
Health Information Act, C.C.S.M. c. P33.5 (Manitoba), Personal Health Information
Protection Act, 2004, S.O. 2004, c. 3, Sch. A (Ontario) and Health Information
Protection Act, S.S. 1999, c. H-0.021 (Saskatchewan).
93 Glaxo Wellcome PLC v. M.N.R. (1998), 81 C.P.R. (3d) 372 (F.C.A.) [Glaxo]
(Considered in BMG FCA, supra note 2 at para. 32).
94 Privacy Act, supra note 89.
95 Access to Information Act, supra note 90.
the possession of a public sector institution governed by access legislation
need not apply under the access legislation but can, instead, seek a court order
for production. Justice Sexton cited the decision because the plaintiff obtained
a disclosure order requiring Revenue Canada to identify certain importers who
were alleged to have infringed its patents. However, personal data protection
focuses exclusively on individuals, not corporate bodies, and is only relevant
in the case of information about identifiable individuals – it has no application
in the case of the identities of corporate persons. The identities of corporate
persons were at issue in the Glaxo Wellcome case, not the identities of indi-
viduals, and the Federal Court of Appeal in that case, accordingly, was only
considering the Access to Information Act, not the Privacy Act.96 The thrust of
the Access to Information Act is in favour of public access to information held
by public sector organizations – the opposite thrust of PIPEDA, which was the
legislation applicable in the BMG v. John Doe case. Thus, the reliance placed
upon the Glaxo Wellcome case by both courts, but particularly the Court of
Appeal, in BMG v. John Doe is entirely misplaced.
Although related to the concept of privacy, personal data protection is not
privacy legislation. It neither confers upon an organization subject to it the abil-
ity or duty to gather information from individuals nor prohibits an organization
from gathering information from individuals. Rather than dealing with whether
information can be gathered about individuals or from individuals, personal data
protection statutes begin by regulating how information is to be gathered about
individuals if the organization either needs or is mandated elsewhere to gather
that type of information. That personal data protection legislation is not strictly
privacy legislation is evidenced by the fact that the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development Guidelines, with which Canada’s regimes delib-
erately concur,97 articulate a dual purpose: not only to protect personal informa-
tion but also to ensure the free flow of data between countries.98
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96 Glaxo, supra note 93 (note that the Privacy Act is not judicially considered).
97 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Guidelines on the
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (Paris, 1981) [OECD
Guidelines]. Canada became a signatory in 1984. Canada’s regimes are also designed
to make Canadian organizations compatible with the EC, Directive 95/46/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of indi-
viduals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of
such data, [1995] O.J. L.281/31. The EU has given this domestic directive an interna-
tional application in that it prohibits those subject to its Directive from sharing infor-
mation with organizations elsewhere who are not obliged to treat personal information
in comparable ways.
98 Colin Bennet, Regulating Privacy: Data Protection and Public Policy in
Europe and the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992) 136–140. See
also OECD Guidelines, ibid.
But privacy, as distinct from statutory personal data protection, clearly has
a role to play in BMG v. John Doe: the fifth branch of the test for disclosure,
which certainly predates personal data protection in Canada, concerns ‘legiti-
mate privacy concerns’. What are these concerns?
Privacy, since the late nineteenth century, has popularly come to be under-
stood as ‘the right to be let alone’99 and there has been increasing debate about
whether, and to what extent, it should be protected by law – even though it has
become enshrined in international instruments (to which Canada is signatory).
First, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)100 provides in Article
12 that:
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy… Everyone has
the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.101
Second, Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights102 provides:
(1) No one shall be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour or
reputation.
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or
attacks.
These instruments do not provide definitions of the concept of privacy and the
classic ‘right to be let alone’, involving the description of privacy as a right,
goes beyond articulating the concept of privacy and makes a claim to legal, or
at least normative, status. This, in turn, may obscure, rather than assist, the
quest to understand the concept of privacy. A better conception might be ‘the
state of being let alone’.103
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99 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1893) 4
Harv.L.Rev. 193 at 213.
100 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217(III), UN GAOR. 3d
Sess., Supp. No. 13, UN Doc. A/810 (1948) 71.
101 Ibid. at Art. 27 contains provisions related to intellectual property: (1)
Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to
enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits. (2) Everyone has
the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scien-
tific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.
102 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(entered into force 1976), online: <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm>.
103 Which concurs with the early usage of privacy recorded in the Oxford English
Dictionary as dating from 1450: ‘The state or condition of being withdrawn from the
society of others, or from the public interest.’
While personal data protection is confined by statute to information about
an identifiable individual,104 privacy can embrace rights to refuse to divulge
any information held by an individual that she or he desires to keep secret,
including information about her or himself.105 Moreover, while personal data
protection, as its name implies, encompasses only data issues,106 privacy
encompasses concerns about a much wider range of interferences with the
individual.107
Nonetheless, while in other societies, at other times, the value of privacy as
it relates to personal information may not have been highly regarded,108 an
individual’s interest in personal information privacy has been enshrined in
Canada as a value to be protected against government incursion. In the crimi-
nal context, the majority of the Supreme Court held:
In fostering the underlying values of dignity, integrity and autonomy, it is fitting that
s. 8 of the Charter should seek to protect a biographical core of personal informa-
tion which individuals in a free and democratic society would wish to maintain and
control from dissemination to the state. This would include information which tends
to reveal intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the individual.109
Again in the criminal context, the Supreme Court held in 1990 that ‘[p]rivacy
may be defined as the right of the individual to determine when, how, and to
what extent he or she will release personal information’.110 In this context, the
Court identified its notion of privacy with the context of personal information,
thus limiting its conception of information privacy. Alan Westin, in the 1960s,
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104 Privacy Act, supra note 89 at s. 3.
105 Margaret Steig, ‘The Nineteenth-Century Information Revolution’ (1980) 15
Journal of Library History 22 (Illustrates the attitude of early industrial British employ-
ers who considered information about their employees to be the private affair of the
employer and therefore not to be made available to the government or anyone else).
106 That is, information contained in records.
107 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, for example, does not contain
a direct reference to privacy, but both s. 7 (‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty and
security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with
the principles of fundamental justice’) and s. 8 (‘Everyone has the right to be secure
against unreasonable search or seizure’) have been interpreted to protect Canadians
against government incursion of privacy interests beyond informational privacy.
108 David Flaherty, Privacy in Colonial New England (Charlottesville, VA:
University Press of Virginia, 1972) at 243–5. (Described the situation in the original
New England colonies of America where the social consensus was that the individuals
harbouring interest in being let alone were suspect.)
109 R. v. Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281 at para. 20, Justice Sopinka, speaking for
Justices LaForest, Gonthier, Cory, Iacobucci, and then Chief Justice Lamer. Justice
McLachlin (as she then was) dissented on other grounds.
110 R. v. Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30 at para. 25.
interpreted privacy in similar language, as including an ‘informational right’:
a right of people and organizations ‘to determine when, how, and to what
extent information about them is communicated to others’.111 However, as
then Chief Justice Lamer pointed out, in his dissent in Aubry v. Editions Vice-
Versa, there are additional limitations on the notion of constitutionally
protected informational privacy in Canada:
the decisions of this Court relating to s.8 [of the Charter] recognize that there is a
fundamental difference between a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his
or her dealings with the state and the same person’s reasonable expectation of
privacy in his or her dealings with ordinary citizens... It would therefore be wrong
to define the scope of the right to privacy between citizens solely on the basis of the
decisions relating to s. 8... the right to privacy can have a different scope in private
law.112
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111 Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York: Atheneum, 1967) at 7.
112 Aubry v. Editions Vice-Versa, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 591 at paras. 8–9 [Aubry]. A
recent decision in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice has comprehensively consid-
ered the place of privacy under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In
Cheskes et al v. A.G.(Ont.), [2007] O.J. no. 3515, 2007 CanLII 38387 (Ont. S.C.),
released 19 September 2007, Justice Belobaba held that the disclosure provisions of
Ontario’s Adoption Information Disclosure Act, S.O. 2005, c.25, proclaimed in force
17 September 2007, as part of the Vital Statistics Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. V.4, as amended,
violated s. 7 of the Charter and are invalid and are of no force or effect. In terms of this
analysis, several aspects of Justice Belobaba’s reasons are worth noting. First, while
setting out ten background points on which the judgment is based, Justice Belobaba
equates personal data protection legislation with privacy [at para.62] and cites the exis-
tence of personal data protection and personal data protection commissioners [‘privacy
commissioners’] as evidence that the protection of privacy is a fundamental value in
modern democracies. Second, the breach of the Charter which Judge Belobaba finds
occurred in this case is characterized [at para.91] as a breach of the right to liberty
under s.7 of the Charter: ‘I have found a breach of the right to liberty by focussing on
the informational privacy interest and applying the reasoning in R. v. O’Connor [[1995]
4 S.C.R. 411 at para.120].’ Justice Belobaba agrees with the analysis herein that ‘there
is no freestanding right to privacy in the Charter. If a right to privacy exists under the
Charter, it has to be found in the provisions that touch on matters of individual auton-
omy.’ [para. 79, footnote omitted]. It should be noted that the Ontario government has
subsequently passed An Act to Amend the Vital Statistics Act in relation to adoption and
to make consequential amendments to the Child and Family Services Act, 2008, S.O.
2008, c.15), which received Royal Assent 14 May 2008, by which, since adoptions
prior to 2008 were under different premises with respect to privacy than the new 2008
provisions, adult adoptees and birth parents whose adoptions were registered in Ontario
prior to 1 September 2008 can place a disclosure veto on their file, but, if they do so,
they will be asked to provide medical history so that the birth relatives can obtain
personal health information. In addition, adult adoptees and birth parents may continue
to place a no-contact notice on their files
Even in the context of the protection of personal information from government
intrusion, the value of informational privacy has been recognized in many
instances to be secondary to other interests. Indeed, the majority of the
Supreme Court in R. v. Plant itself held that the accused’s reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy was outweighed by the public interest in criminal enforcement
in the situation at bar. Other examples of legislated incursions on informa-
tional privacy are the census legislation and income tax legislation, both of
which have become very controversial, on privacy grounds.113
By contrast, although there is a recognition in Canada of at least some limi-
tations on the ability of government to intrude into the lives of Canadians and
disrupt their ‘state of being alone’, including situations involving information
privacy, in the private sector, there is not a strong body of consistent jurispru-
dence establishing the existence of a tort of invasion of privacy. The Manitoba
Court of Appeal, in 1986, stated:
It would appear that at common law the tort of violation of privacy in regard to
disclosure of personal information has not been recognized in Canada. Neither
counsel has supplied us with a case indicating that this tort has been recognized.
Counsel for defendants states simply that the tort has not been recognized although
recognized in the United States of America. This is certainly not a proper or
adequate factual situation to develop new law on the tort of invasion of privacy
rights at common law.114
In Ontario, in 1996, a case arose which the court of first instance decided on
privacy grounds, Gould Estate v. Stoddart Publishing.115 But the decision of
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113 There was a recent controversy in Canada about the full release of post-1911
census records: see Beatty v. Canada (A.G.) (2004), [2005] 1 F.C.R. 327, [2004] F.C.J.
No. 1162. Beginning in 1911 the enumerators were required by Order-in-Council (31
March 1911 at 11) as follows ‘The facts and statistics of the Census may not be used
except for statistical compilations, and positive assurances should be given on this
point if a fear is entertained by any person that they may be used for taxation or any
other object.’ There was no time limit placed upon this undertaking and so it clashed
with the legislated time limits for personal data protection in the public sector (the
Privacy Act and the Access to Information Act, infra) legislated by Parliament much
later in the twentieth century. The result was An Act to Amend the Statistics Act, S.C.
2005, c. 31 (introduced first through Senate) – whereby the censuses taken between
1910 and 2005 become public 92 years after the census – but beginning with the 2006
census, the individuals to whom the information relates in the census must consent to
the release of their information after 92 years. In 2006, only 56% consented, which
raises concerns, especially amongst genealogists and historians (see Gregory Bonnell
‘Canadians lose “crucial” pieces of historical information in 2006 census: expert’
Canadian Press NewsWire (15 March 2007)).
114 Bingo Enterprises Ltd. v. Plaxton (1986), 26 D.L.R. (4th) 604 (Man. C.A.).
115 Gould Estate v. Stoddard Publishing Co. (1996), 31 C.C.L.T. (2d) 224 (Ont.
 
that court was overturned in 1998 on appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal.
The Court of Appeal held that the case should be decided purely on copyright
grounds. In a more recent Ontario decision, the court held that it was possible
that a claim to privacy could be the subject of a successful lawsuit but the liti-
gation never continued to trial.116
There is, however, legislation117 in four common law jurisdictions of
Canada that gives individuals a right to sue for certain violations of privacy:
Saskatchewan (1978),118 Manitoba (1987),119 Newfoundland (1990)120 and
British Columbia (1996).121
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Gen. Div.), rev’d (1998), 39 O.R. (3d) 545 (Ont. C.A.). (The facts in the case were chal-
lenging in terms of the claim to invasion of privacy: the person whose privacy was
alleged to have been violated was the famous pianist Glenn Gould, who was dead
before the litigation arose; the author of the published piece which was alleged to have
violated the privacy interest, Jock Carroll, was also dead before the legislation arose;
the litigation was being maintained by the estate of the musician and the publishers.)
116 Somwar v. McDonald’s Restaurant of Canada Ltd. (2006), 79 O.R. (3d) 172
(Ont. S.C.J.).
117 Canada is a federated state and, under its constitution, legislative power was
divided in 1867 between the provinces and the federal government according to
enumerated headings (Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in
R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5). Naturally, given its nineteenth century origins, very few
information topics are reflected in this list of powers – really only copyrights and
patents (see Constitution Act, 1867, ibid., ss. 91(22) (23)). However, the provinces
retained exclusive power to legislate in areas of ‘purely local and private interest’ (see
Constitution Act, 1867, and also Re: Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373 and R. v.
Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401). Matters that do not fall within
provincial heads are legislated federally under the residual power stated in s. 91 (see
Constitution Act, s. 91, where the opening words empower the federal Parliament ‘to
make laws for the peace, order, and good government of Canada, in relation to all
matters not coming within the classes of subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to
the Legislatures of the provinces…’). Constitutionally, there is little argument for
federal legislative control over privacy since property and civil rights and matters of
local concern were specifically allocated to the provinces and have typically been inter-
preted very broadly: Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Scarborough, Ont.:
Carswell, 2006) 453. Privacy is generally considered as related to human rights as well
as being a matter of local concern. On the other hand, personal data protection has been
legislated by both the federal and provincial governments of Canada, as described else-
where, as an adjunct to the named subject areas of power each level of government
already has under the Constitution Act.
118 Privacy Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. P-24, s. 2.
119 Privacy Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. P125, s. 2(1).
120 Privacy Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. P-22, s. 3.
121 Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 373, s. 1. The original Privacy Act in British
Columbia was the first in Canada, enacted in 1968 (S.B.C. 1968, c. 39). In J.M.F. v.
Chappell, [1998] B.C.J. No.276, it was determined that in criminal proceedings
(governed under the federal Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46), civil rules such as
those represented by the Privacy Act could not be in conflict and did not apply.
Particularly in the first three of these provinces, the statutes are articulated
in terms of a focus on particular situations: surveillance, eavesdropping, and
certain itemized commercial situations. For example, in Saskatchewan:
s. 2 It is a tort, actionable without proof of damages, for a person wilfully and
without claim of right, to violate the privacy of another person.
s. 3 Without limiting the generality of s.2, proof that there has been:
(a) auditory or visual surveillance of a person by any means including eaves-
dropping, watching, spying, besetting or following and whether or not
accomplished by trespass;
(b) listening to or recording of a conversation in which a person participates,
or listening to or recording of messages to or from that person passing by
means of telecommunications, otherwise than as a lawful party thereto;
(c) use of the name or likeness or voice of a person for the purposes of adver-
tising or promoting the sale of, or any other trading in, any property or
services, or for any other purposes of gain to the user if, in the course of the
use, the person is identified or identifiable and the user intended to exploit
the name or likeness or voice of that person; or
(d) use of letters, diaries or other personal documents of a person; without the
consent, express or implied, of the person or some other person who has
the lawful authority to give consent is prima facie evidence of a violation
of the privacy of the person first mentioned.
There appear to have been very, very few successful actions brought under any
of these statutes.122
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122 There have been a number of cases argued in British Columbia but most have
been unsuccessful, at least on the Privacy Act claims. David v. McArthur (1969), 10
D.L.R. (3d) 250, rev’d (1970) 17 D.L.R. (3d) (B.C.C.A.) involved the activities of a
private investigator hired by a husband to conduct surveillance of a wife. Belzberg v.
British Columbia Television Broadcasting Ltd (1981) (unreported but described in the
Silber case below) was a case in which a privacy claim was made in addition to a claim
in trespass, over photographs of a front door taken and broadcast without permission.
In Wooding v. Little (1982), 24 C.C.L.T. 37, [1982] B.C.J. No. 1422 (B.C.S.C.) (QL)
invasion of privacy and libel were both claimed and qualified privilege was held to be
a defence to both causes of action. Silber v. British Columbia Television Broadcasting
System (1985), 25 D.L.R. (4th) 345 involved the filming and broadcasting of an indi-
vidual in a parking lot, as Justice Lysyk said:
in the middle of the day, on a site open to unobstructed view from an adjoining
heavily travelled thoroughfare, in a busy commercial neighbourhood. The property
was private in the sense that the plaintiffs had the right to exclude trespassers from
it, but Mr. Silber could hardly expect to enjoy a right of privacy with respect to what
happened there because that was open for anyone happening by to see (para. 17).
In Insurance Corporation of British Columbia v. Somosh (1983), 51 B.C.L.R. 344, a
counterclaim for invasion of privacy by defendants to an action by the insurer of an
Quebec, Canada’s civil law jurisdiction, by contrast, has enacted a provin-
cial statute which it has entitled the Quebec Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.123 In it, the province gives privacy its strongest and clearest legal
expression in Canada:124
s. 4 Every person has a right to the safeguard of his dignity, honour and 
reputation
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automobile against an owner and driver was successful. The main action was
dismissed, but on the counterclaim, a private investigator’s inquiries about the finan-
cial positions of the defendants were found to be invasions of privacy. On the other
hand, in Rusche v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, [1992] B.C.J. No.87, 4 C.P.C.
(3d) 12 (B.C. S.C.), a jury finding that there was no breach of the Privacy Act in the
actions of private investigators was left undisturbed. In Milton v. Savinkoff, [1993]
B.C.J. No. 2396 (B.C. S.C.), a woman did not succeed in her claim of violation of
privacy having carelessly left photos of herself partially clothed in the defendant’s
jacket but objecting to their being distributed to another acquaintance. In
Hollingsworth v. BCTV, a division of Westcom TV Group Ltd., [1998] B.C.J. No.2451,
[1999] 6 W.W.R. 54, 59 B.C.L.R. (3d) 121, in an action founded also in libel, the
British Columbia Court of Appeal held that the Privacy Act did not apply in a claim
against BCTV. In St. Pierre v. Pacific Newspaper Group Inc., [2006] B.C.J. No. 259
(B.C. S.C.), the Vancouver Sun was exonerated from a claim under the Privacy Act,
concerning publication of a photograph, on the grounds of consent (s. 2(2)(a)) although
found liable for defamation. One successful case, Poirier v. Wal-Mart Canada Corp.,
2006 BCSC 1138 involved photographs:
It is a tort, actionable without proof of damage, for a person to use the name or
portrait of another for the purpose of advertising or promoting the sale of, or other
trading in, property or services, unless that other ... consents to the use for that
purpose (British Columbia Privacy Act, s. 3(2) cited in para. 74).
In that case, Wal-Mart was found to have violated its long-term employee’s rights by
posting the employee’s name and photograph beside a message welcoming shoppers to
a new Wal-Mart location. In an earlier case involving a photograph, a British
Columbian court held that reproductions of a photograph of an unidentified torso did
not violate the privacy rights of the model who posed for the photograph: Joseph v.
Daniels (Brent Daniels Photography) (1986), 4 B.C.L.R. (2d) 239, 11 C.P.R. (3d) 544.
In Manitoba, in 1988, an interlocutory injunction was granted on the grounds of either
private nuisance or under the Privacy Act where the defendant was harassed by mail
and telephone in Pateman v. Ross, [1988] 68 Man.R. (2d) 181, and in Ferguson v.
McBee Technographics Inc. (1989), 24 C.P.R. (3d) 240 (Man. Q.B.), portions of an
affidavit filed in a proceeding in slander and injurious falsehood were struck as inad-
missible because they were based on conversations to which the affiant was not party
and they therefore prima facie violated s. 3(b) of the Privacy Act and were not saved
under s. 5(c) of the Act as ‘reasonable, necessary for, and incidental to, the protection
of the person, property or other interests’.
123 The Quebec Charter of human rights and freedoms, R.S.Q. c. C-12.
124 There is no exception in it for newspapers.
s. 5 Every person has a right to respect for his private life
s. 9 Every person has a right to non-disclosure of confidential 
information
In 1998, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, on appeal from the
Quebec Court of Appeal,125 reinforced that strong privacy protection in Aubry
v. Editions Vice-Versa.126
Looking only at the chequered patchwork of privacy protection in Canada,
especially in common law Canada, it may not be surprising that Justice Sexton
felt that ‘privacy concerns…must yield to…intellectual property rights…’127
– but is there another approach to consider in the BMG v. John Doe scenario
in evaluating ‘privacy concerns’?
THE ROLE OF CONFIDENTIALITY IN PRIVACY AND
PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION
It is interesting that the information privacy right in Quebec is framed in terms
of non-disclosure of confidential information: in terms of confidentiality and
not in terms of personal information. Justice La Forest, in the criminal context
in 1988, quoted with approval from a 1972 federal government report: ‘This
notion of privacy derives from the assumption that all information about a
person is in a fundamental way his own, for him to communicate or retain for
himself as he sees fit.’128 But Justice La Forest then went on to say:
In modern society, especially, retention of information about oneself is extremely
important. We may, for one reason or another, wish or be compelled to reveal such
information, but situations abound where the reasonable expectations of the indi-
vidual that the information shall remain confidential to the persons to whom, and
restricted to the purposes for which it is divulged, must be protected.129
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125 Aubry, supra note 112.
126 Ibid., L’Heureux-Dubé J., Bastarache J. for the majority opinion, Gonthier J.,
Cory J., and Iacobucci J., concurring, Major J., and Lamer C.J.C., dissenting. Both
Justices Lamer and Major dissented because there was no evidence of damages – but
Chief Justice Lamer went on to dissent saying the right to privacy must be given a
different scope in dealings between private parties than it is in dealings between indi-
viduals and government. Thus in the civil context of Ms Aubry’s complaint, he would
have required that the defendants in the case had committed a fault before giving the
plaintiff Ms Aubry redress.
127 Ibid. at para. 41, quoted above.
128 R. v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417 at para. 22 (citing Canada, Report of the
Task Force established by the Department of Communications/Department of Justice,
Privacy, and Computers (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1972) at 13).
129 Ibid.
Canadian criminal law has, for some time, created legal protections of confi-
dences for Canadians who choose to disseminate information, in such offences
as s. 183 prohibiting the interception of private communications ‘made under
circumstances where it is reasonable for the originator to expect that [the
communication] will not be intercepted by any person other than the person
intended by the originator thereof to receive it...’130
In the civil context, there have long been particular legally recognized
duties of confidence and the courts have imposed penalties upon confiders for
breach of their duties in cases where the individual whose confidence had been
broken sued. The courts in these cases have focussed on the relationship
between the parties rather than the subject matter of the confidence. The legal
protection of these information exchanges has been about confidentiality, not
privacy. Since the late 1980s Canadian courts have continually expanded their
protection of confidences, particularly in the commercial context, to the point
now where the action for breach of confidence embraces situations far wider
than just those involving information exchanges between or about individu-
als.131 Since the late 1980s in Canada, the courts have recompensed the
confider for a breach:
(1) if the information is secret;
(2) if the information was imparted in confidence, and
(3) if the information is such that it would save the confidante time, energy
and expense and is used in an unauthorized fashion to the detriment of
the confider.132
It should be noted there is no apparent public participation in this area. In
patent, the public is guaranteed the right to inspect the innovations
patented;133 in copyright there is the public’s right to the free circulation of
ideas and facts as well as users’ rights.134 And in both cases, the monopolies
given the economic rights holders are temporally limited. As the intellectual
property device of protection of confidential information is developing, the
public has no right of access to the subject matter of the secret, in any form,
ever (there is no time limit to the monopoly of the confider on the secret).135
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130 Criminal Code, supra note 121, s. 183.
131 Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574,
[1989] S.C.J. No. 83; Cadbury Schweppes Inc. v. FBI Foods Ltd., [1999] 1 S.C.R. 142.
132 Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd., ibid.
133 Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4, s.10.
134 Discussed more fully below.
135 And because this is not an area of legislative law, there is no possibility of
testing this legal development against the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
(specifically, s. 2(b) the right to freedom of expression, which includes access).
 
Breach of confidence has gradually entered into the arena of international
trade agreement. The fullest expression of obligations concerning confidential
information is found in the TRIPS Agreement:136
Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing information
lawfully within their control from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others
without their consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices so long
as such information:
(a) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and
assembly of its components, generally known among or readily accessible to
persons within the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in
question;
(b) has commercial value because it is secret; and has been subject to reasonable
steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully in control of the infor-
mation, to keep it secret.137
Both Kim Scheppele and Elizabeth Neill have published doctoral dissertation
work focussing on definitional issues germane to any attempt to draw distinc-
tions between notions of privacy, personal data protection and confidential
information. In Legal Secrets, Scheppele138 has described an analytic frame-
work which would identify the protection described in R. v. Plant as legal
protection for direct transmission of ‘secrets’ from one individual (A) to
another (B: the government). Scheppele treats as ‘serial secrets’ all secrets that
have already moved from their original confider (A) to a confidante (B) where
issues have arisen concerning further dissemination from that confidante (B)
to another (C). She would place all such secrets under the rubric of ‘confiden-
tiality’ rather than privacy. Neill,139 in Rites of Privacy and the Privacy Trade,
also wrestled with these issues and argued for a conception of privacy as an
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136 Member countries, including Canada, are limited in the exceptions they can
create to those permitted under Article 13: ‘Members shall confine limitations or
exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a
normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate inter-
ests of the right holder.’
137 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (1994), 33
I.L.M. 1197, section 7, art. 39 [TRIPS]. The North American Free Trade Agreement
Between the Government of Canada, the Government of Mexico and the Government
of the United States, 17 December 1992, Can. T.S. 1994 No. 2, 32 I.L.M. 289 (entered
into force 1 January 1994) [NAFTA] also contains obligations for Canada, the United
States and Mexico in this area, providing that trade secrets shall be protected if they are
secret, are of actual or potential commercial value and the confider has taken reason-
able steps to keep them secret – see Articles 1711 (1), (2) & (3).
138 Kim Lane Scheppele, Legal Secrets: Equality and Efficiency in the Common
Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).
139 Elizabeth Neill, Rites of Privacy and the Privacy Trade: On the Limits of
Protection for the Self (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 2001).
extension of our ‘sacred selves’. Her argument is that, in imparting informa-
tion under circumstances of confidentiality, an individual is extending the
circle of the self to deliberately embrace other individuals – in the expectation
of continued privacy. Neill specifically distinguishes her conception of the
boundaries of privacy, which would generally include personal confidential
relationships, from personal data protection, which she argues falls outside
privacy.140 While extending the legal remedy of breach of confidence to the
corporate commercial environment might be argued to be an extension of
privacy values to corporations (who are, after all, legally endowed with capac-
ity as persons), such an extension would be an anathema to Neill’s perspective
on privacy. It seems far more persuasive that this extension of the law of
breach of confidence is one that clearly illustrates the conceptual differences
between confidentiality and privacy.
Organizations that fall under personal data protection regimes are required
to adhere to the dictates of the legislation so long as the information they hold
continues to be identified with an individual. This responsibility arises and
continues whether or not the individual subject is even aware either of the
information’s existence within that organization or of the contents of that
information. Moreover, in virtually all Canadian jurisdictions, this responsi-
bility continues for a number of years after the death of the subject individ-
ual.141 These characteristics of personal data protection differentiate it from
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140 From the point of view of creating consistent information policy across
Canada, Scheppele’s conception, which distinguishes privacy and confidentiality, may
be more useful – and, indeed, her approach may actually strengthen Neill’s argument
that personal data protection does not form a part of privacy policy. However, in the
context of this discussion, since the ISPs had confidentiality agreements with their
subscribers, Neill’s conception would focus even greater attention on the implications
of those arrangements.
141 The federal government, in the Privacy Act, supra note 89, protects personal
information held by the governed public sector organizations for 20 years following
death (s. 3 ‘personal information’ (m)) whereas, under PIPEDA, supra note 81, it
protects an individual’s information held by private sector organizations either until 20
years after death or until 100 years after the document was created, whichever is the
shorter (ss. 7(3)(h)(i), (ii)). British Columbia’s legislation also operates with a 20 years
after death time frame (Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act,
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 165, s. 22(4) taken together with s. 36 (c)) and Nova Scotia’s legis-
lation is similar (Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.N.S. 1993,
c. 5, s. 20(4) taken together with s. 30(c)). Newfoundland’s legislation operates to
protect information for 20 years after a person’s death or for 50 years after the docu-
ment was created, at least where the information is held in archives (Access to
Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.N.L. 2002 c. A-1.1, s. 42(c),(d)).
Alberta and Saskatchewan protect personal information until 25 years after the indi-
vidual’s death (Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.A. 2000, c.
F-25, s. 17(2)(i), the Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy
 
legislation and common law which have arisen in defence of privacy rights.
Personal data protection statutes artificially limit the abilities of the organiza-
tions governed by them because they generally prohibit collection of informa-
tion about individuals from sources other than those individuals. Though
digitization and the internet increasingly make available information about
various people, organizations subject to personal data protection legislation
must often ignore available sources of information and limit their access to
information about identifiable individuals to seeking information from those
individuals personally. Organizations subject to these statutes, even having
properly accessed and collected information about identifiable individuals, are
also limited by the legislation in the uses to which the collected information
can be put. Thus these statutes, since they do not deal with the right to require
an individual to disseminate information to particular organizations, but do
limit the scope of the organization’s abilities to use the information collected
from individuals about themselves and prohibit its further dissemination
except in very strict circumstances, appear to be extensions of the law of confi-
dentiality, rather than privacy statutes. These laws mandate a relationship of
confidence between individuals providing information about themselves to
organizations and the affected organizations.142 The individual’s entitlement
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Act, R.S.S. 1990–91, c. L-27, 1 s. 29(1), the Freedom of Information and Protection of
Privacy Act, R.S.S. 1990–1991, c. F-22.01, s. 30(1)). Prince Edward Island’s legisla-
tion generally protects personal information for 25 years after death (Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.P.E.I., c. F-15.01, s. 15(2)(i)). Ontario
protects personal information until 30 years after death (Freedom of Information and
Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31, s. 2(2); Municipal Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.56, s. 2(2)) and Quebec
does the same, unless the record is over 100 years old (An Act respecting the protection
of personal information in the private sector, supra note 82, s. 18.2.). Manitoba, on the
other hand, protects information only until 10 years after an individual’s death (the
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, C.C.S.M. 1997, c. F175 1997
s. 17(4)). New Brunswick’s legislation contains no term of protection but appears to
leave the matter open to regulation (Protection of Personal Information Act, S.N.B. c.
P-19.1, s. 7).
142 Viewing personal data protection as statutorily created relationships of
confidence, rather than fundamental privacy protection, may help to explain certain
decisions of governments to make public information which would otherwise fall
under personal data protection. One might point to the Ontario government’s recent
decisions to protect participants in adoptions before September 2008 from disclosure
of their identities while requiring that adoptions from now on are subject to disclo-
sure, albeit limited (see supra, note 112).The Ontario legislature took this action over
the objections of the Ontario Privacy Commissioner (Office of the Privacy
Commissioner of Ontario, News Release, ‘Controversial adoption disclosure bill
faces final vote but much needed protection missing (21 October 2005), online:
<http://www.ipc.on.ca/ index.asp?layid=86&fid1=418>). Neither she nor any other
can appeal to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to insist upon privacy
to confidentiality in information supplied to organizations is limited under this
legislation to information that is, and remain, identified with that individual
personally. This is a much narrower scope of protection for confidences than
is available in other areas of law providing legal protection for confidences.
The narrow focus of this particular legal protection for confidentiality, limited
as it is to confidences involving subject matter identified with the individual
confider, is probably the source of much of the conceptual confusion between
personal data protection legislation and privacy concepts.143
Moreover, it must be recalled that Canada’s obligations under the OECD
Guidelines are intended not only to protect personal information, but also to
ensure the free flow of data between countries. One of the policy reasons that
information about identifiable individuals held by affected organizations is to
be gathered from those individuals directly is presumably to ensure integrity
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protection for the parents (mothers) who put these children up for adoption years ago
with assurances of privacy. Other examples of legal initiatives that counter the
notions of privacy as a constitutional right are various provincial salary disclosure
laws (in Ontario, see the Public Sector Salary Disclosure Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 1,
Sch. A, which requires that all employees making over $100,000 per year, and their
exact salaries, be published by public sector institutions annually; in Nova Scotia, see
Ministerial Education Act Regulation 80/97, as amended up to N.S. Reg. 120/2006,
concerning annual reporting of school board salaries, made under s. 145 of the
Education Act, S.N.S. 1995-96, c.1).
143 This confusion has only been exacerbated by the decision of the Supreme
Court in H.J. Heinz Co. of Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2006] 1 S.C.R.
441, [Heinz cited to S.C.R], where the majority of the Court held that the ‘privacy’ right
under personal data protection legislation can be exercised on behalf of individuals by
corporations. Personal data protection legislation carefully distinguishes between the
rights under these statutes given to ‘individuals’, rather than legal ‘persons’ (in order to
exclude corporate ‘persons’ from the direct ambit of personal data protection), and
those rights given to ‘third parties’ – corporations, companies, and businesses (which
have their own exemptions and protections). The minority in Heinz believed that corpo-
rate parties should be limited to claiming the exemptions specifically targeted for them.
The majority permitted Heinz to invoke personal data protection exemptions to the
federal access legislation in order to block release of information to a requestor. The
individuals identified in the disputed information were not party to the litigation. Not
only does the decision greatly enhance the ability of corporations to censor the public
discourse, it distorts the purpose of the personal data protection regimes by wresting
some control of personal information away from individuals and putting it back into
the hands of corporations. The Court used the vocabulary of privacy throughout the
judgment. If the Court had conceptualized the problem in terms of a legislated confi-
dence between an identified individual and the public sector organization holding the
data, it is submitted that it is less likely that the majority would have acceded to the
request of a third party corporation to represent the interests of the confider individual,
without notice to the individual concerned, and step into the shoes of the confider to
insist that the confidante government organization not divulge the information to a
requestor.
in the data. This perspective is reinforced by the provision in these statutes
requiring the affected organizations to either correct information held by iden-
tifiable individuals when an error is pointed out by the individual concerned
or, at least, to keep a record of disagreement which reveals the related infor-
mation provided by the subject which differs from the previously held infor-
mation recorded by the organization. These provisions of personal data
protection legislation cannot be interpreted as part of the concept of privacy.
They provide a function in information terms that has long been provided by
the law of defamation in situations where information about individuals is
published. Libel law does not protect individual privacy – it does, however,
protect individual reputations by limiting the publication of false information
about individuals (where the individual is injured by the falsity) and, at the
same time, provides protection for the integrity of published information about
individuals. Personal data protection statutes provide the same functionality,
ensuring data integrity, and thus contribute to the efficiency and effectiveness
of flows of information between countries. This function of personal data
protection is quite unrelated to notions of privacy.
Thus it would seem that Justice Sexton’s characterization of the ‘concerns’
involved in the BMG v. John Doe case as ‘privacy concerns’ swept together a
complex set of separate considerations involving personal data protection and
confidential relationships. Juxtaposing such a set of complex concepts against
the complex set of concepts which is intellectual property cannot lead to a
clear resolution of any particular challenging situation – instead each situation
must be fully analyzed in light of specific intellectual property interests and
‘privacy concerns’ actually at issue.
REVISITING BMG v. JOHN DOE
It will be recalled that the parties in BMG v. John Doe agreed ‘an ISP by virtue
of s. 7(3)(c) of PIPEDA may disclose personal information without consent
pursuant to a court order’. The relevant section reads:
(3) For the purpose of clause 4.3 of Schedule 1, and despite the note that accom-
panies that clause, an organization may disclose personal information without
the knowledge or consent of the individual only if the disclosure is
(c) required to comply with a subpoena or warrant issued or an order made by a
court, person or body with jurisdiction to compel the production of informa-
tion, or to comply with rules of court relating to the production of records.
Clause 4.3 of Schedule 1 deals with ‘Principle 3 – Consent’ and provides that
‘[t]he knowledge and consent of the individual are required for the collection,
use, or disclosure of personal information, except where inappropriate’.
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Records are defined under PIPEDA144 and do not include records that an
organization would have to create – so, it would appear, on the same logic as
Justice Sexton applied in considering Rule 233,145 that s. 7(3) of PIPEDA in
this case would only apply in respect of the production of information (and not
in terms of compliance with rules of court relating to the production of
records) since there were no extant records at issue here. So the question
would be whether the court had jurisdiction to compel the production of infor-
mation.146
And this leads back to the realization that the only jurisdiction that the court
had in this case to compel the production of information was a jurisdiction that
includes consideration of whether the public interests in favour of the disclo-
sure outweigh the legitimate privacy concerns.
So the key question becomes whether there is a public interest in favour of
disclosure to the plaintiffs in this copyright infringement proceeding that
outweighs the legitimate privacy concerns of the potential defendants. If legit-
imate privacy concerns prevail, then there is no jurisdiction in the court to
compel production of this information and the provisions of s. 7(3) of
PIPEDA, the data protection legislation dictating the terms of a confidential
relationship between the ISPs and their customers, would require the ISPs to
keep that information confidential.
This is a different approach from that taken by Justice Sexton in his analy-
sis in BMG v. John Doe. Justice Sexton explicitly equates consideration of the
privacy interests at stake in his consideration of the fifth criterion (for consid-
ering compelling disclosure of the identities at issue) with a consideration of
PIPEDA: ‘Privacy rights are significant and they must be protected. In order to
achieve the appropriate balance between privacy rights and the public interest
in favour of disclosure, PIPEDA provides protection...’147 At this point Justice
Sexton’s analysis became completely circular: PIPEDA permits disclosure if
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144 PIPEDA, supra note 81, s. 2 (‘Record’ includes any correspondence, memo-
randum, book, plan, map, drawing, diagram, pictorial or graphic work, photograph,
film, microform, sound recording, videotape, machine-readable record and any other
documentary material, regardless of physical form or characteristics, and any copy of
any of those things).
145 BMG FC, supra note 2 at para. 15 (Justice von Finckenstein held that only
Rule 238 could be relevant to the outcome of this motion because under Rule 233 there
would have to be a relevant document in existence and, in this case, any such document
would have to be created).
146 An act respecting access to documents held by public bodies and the
Protection of personal information, supra note 91, ss. 18-26 (This provision does not
appear to exist in the Quebec statute governing the private sector; sections governing
communication to third persons).
147 BMG FCA, supra note 2 at para. 38.
there is a court order and the court used PIPEDA to determine whether there
ought to be a court order – which inevitably led to a conclusion that there
ought to be a court order – the conclusion Justice Sexton reached.148
It is not surprising, given his approach, that Justice Sexton then stated that
‘privacy concerns may be met if the court orders that the user only be identi-
fied by initials, or makes a confidentiality order’149 – but under personal data
protection legislation, including PIPEDA, the only actions contemplated are
either the release or the withholding of a record – there is no provision for
qualified release of the type envisioned by Justice Sexton. And even from a
privacy perspective, rather than that of personal data protection legislation, the
use of initials or a confidentiality order would not save the alleged infringer
from public notoriety, it would not protect the alleged infringer from the
lawsuit or from the plaintiffs having knowledge of his identity or home
computer habits.
THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Since PIPEDA governs the information being sought in this application, by
virtue of its being held by ISPs, the overriding public interest, as expressed by
Parliament for the public, in the situation before the courts in BMG v. John
Doe, then, must be the purpose for PIPEDA:
to establish rules [for organizations engaged in commercial activities]…in a manner
that recognizes the right of privacy of individuals with respect to their personal
information…and the need of [such] organizations [for] personal information for
purposes that a reasonable person would consider appropriate150
Parliament has tempered this right to privacy and the needs of the organi-
zations governed by PIPEDA through the inclusion of certain exceptions in
the legislation. It is true that, as agreed by the parties in BMG v. John Doe, one
of these exceptions to the right to privacy in PIPEDA is the requirement that
a custodial organization disclose personal information where required by court
order.151 But when asking, in considering the question of disclosure under the
five part test under the Federal Court Rule 238, whether the ‘public interests
in favour of disclosure’ outweigh ‘the legitimate privacy concerns’, it must be
borne in mind that there is, just since 2004, a clear articulation against disclo-
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sure of personal data held by private sector organizations in Canada in legis-
lation. Rather than outweighing legitimate privacy concerns, this legislation
explicitly articulates those concerns as a part of its raison d’être.
Justice von Finckenstein152 and Justice Sexton, for the Court of Appeal,
cited a number of cases in support of the proposition that various public inter-
ests in favour of disclosure in civil proceedings had outweighed legitimate
privacy concerns in the past. However, all of these cases arose prior to the full
implementation of PIPEDA in the private sector.153 Justice von Finckenstein
noted Ontario First Nations Limited Partnership v. John Doe,154 Canadian
Blood Services/Société du Sang v. John Doe,155 Wa’el Chehab v. John Doe,156
Kibale v. Canada,157 Loblaw Companies Ltd v. Aliant Telecom Inc. and
Yahoo.158 The Federal Court of Appeal in BMG v. John Doe particularly
picked up on and noted the Loblaw case, where Rule 32.12 of the New
Brunswick Rules of Court was used to compel production of the identity of
someone who sent an e-mail spreading confidential information around the
Loblaw operation.159 Irwin Toy v. Doe,160 also cited by both courts, was a 2000
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158 Supra note 153.
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160 Irwin Toy v. Doe (2000), 12 C.P.C. (5th) 103 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 37. See also
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case, decided at a time when personal data protection in common law Canada
applied only to public sector organizations.161 The Federal Court of Appeal
picked up on and noted this case, decided under Rules 30.10 and 31.10 of
Ontario’s Rules of Civil Procedure, and holding that a third party could be
compelled to produce the identity of senders of e-mail from ISPs in a defama-
tion suit.162 When these cases were decided, ‘the public interests in favour of
disclosure’ might have been properly said to ‘outweigh the legitimate privacy
concerns’ because there was no personal data protection regime in the private
sector in common law Canada. However, in the circumstances of BMG v. John
Doe, there is a personal data protection regime in place in Canada in the
private sector – that clearly establishes a public interest in personal data
protection – and thus renders these previous decisions inapplicable to the
analysis that should have been undertaken by the courts in BMG v. John Doe.
Were it otherwise, if the Court of Appeal in BMG v. John Doe is correct, then
ISPs will be ordered to identify individuals in any case where a plaintiff can
establish a civil claim, not even a prima facie case, against those individuals.
There is surely no qualitative difference between the civil claims of a plaintiff
for copyright infringement and those of a plaintiff in any other civil proceed-
ings, for example in divorce proceedings or a debtor-creditor issue. One might
expect those seeking personal information about others to launch suits that
they might not otherwise pursue because of the information that could be
made available in preliminary proceedings. And the ‘protection’ of PIPEDA
would be rendered unstable, to say the least.163 At any time an individual
might discover that another had enough of a claim against her or him, in at
least one area of law, to render the confidentiality of communications between
that individual and her or his ISP defunct.164
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163 Jane Bailey’s quite different analysis of the BMG v. John Doe case, in a
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164 It would seem that this might raise concerns in the context of Canada’s inter-
national obligations under TRIPS and NAFTA because, in addition to the information
concerning customers’ personal data raising issues in the realm of personal data protec-
tion, it could lead to breaches of confidence ‘contrary to honest commercial practices’.
What then are the ‘public interests in favour of disclosure’? PIPEDA legis-
lates those interests in disclosure that transcend personal data protection: they
are laid out in s. 7(3) of the Act (which makes reference to the accompanying
provisions from Schedule 1 to the Act). They are subsections relating to
Canadians’ overriding interest in law enforcement:
…an organization may disclose personal information without the knowledge or
consent of the individual only if the disclosure is
(c) made to a government institution or part of a government institution that has
made a request for information, identified its lawful authority to obtain the
information and indicated that
(i) it suspects that the information relates to national security, the defence of
Canada or the conduct of international affairs,
(ii) the disclosure is requested for the purpose of enforcing any law of Canada,
a province or a foreign jurisdiction, carrying out an investigation relating
to the enforcement of any such law or gathering intelligence for the
purpose of enforcing any such law, or
(iii) the disclosure is requested for the purpose of administering any law of
Canada or a province;165
Nowhere in PIPEDA are the interests of private litigants, or those of intellec-
tual property rights holders, generally placed ahead of personal data protection
interests. How then can it be said that ‘public interests in favour of disclo-
sure…outweigh the legitimate privacy concerns’ in the BMG v. John Doe liti-
gation?
In this context, then, properly weighing the public interest in privacy
against the public interest in private litigation protecting copyright interests
must be revisited: Justice Sexton’s consideration of the social importance of
intellectual property rights must also be revisited.
The answer to the question of whether there is a public interest in assisting
private litigants to pursue their remedies under the Copyright Act must be yes
– not because of the nature of these rights as property rights but because of
their nature as legislated intellectual property rights. But where that interest in
assisting private litigants to pursue their remedies involves disclosure of
personal data protection held by private sector third parties engaged in
commercial activities, does that interest necessarily outweigh other interests –
specifically legitimate privacy concerns? The answer must be no.
On this analysis, the fifth element of the requirement for a disclosure order
under Rule 238 or the equitable remedy for disclosure is not met. Therefore an
order for disclosure should not be given in these circumstances. If such an
order is not given, then there is no exemption from the rights of the internet
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customers under PIPEDA and the ISPs must not disclose the identities of these
customers to anyone other than the individual customers, upon request. What
would the implications of such a finding be?
If the reasoning suggested herein is adopted and the identities of the ISP
customers are not ordered disclosed in civil proceedings for copyright
infringement, will the plaintiffs necessarily be completely without remedy?
First of all, if the identities of the alleged infringers come to light other than
through the channels of the ISPs, then the plaintiffs are free to continue their
lawsuit. Secondly, the Copyright Act provides for criminal proceedings against
those who infringe upon the rights of copyright holders.166 In the case of crim-
inal proceedings, the public interest is much clearer than in disputes between
private parties in civil proceedings. If rights holders invoke the criminal
process, it would seem that there would be a much greater argument that the
privacy rights of those against whom a sufficient case for disclosure can be
made should be suspended in favour of the Queen’s justice.
Is this result inconsistent with the general regime of intellectual property?
No. Even within the copyright regime itself, the economic interests in copy-
right must be balanced both with moral rights interests and with users’ rights.
The economic interests in copyright such as those held by the plaintiffs in
BMG v. John Doe are not the only intellectual property rights related to the
musical works and recordings involved in that case, and therefore it is too
simplistic to conclude that the economic rights holders should necessarily be
given priority167 as opposed to other rights holders – whether other rights
holders within the copyright regime (authors or users) or those whose interests
lie under personal data protection legislation or the legal protection of privacy.
Thus, given that there is a public interest in supporting the copyright holder’s
pursuit of economic interests under the Copyright Act that must be balanced
even within the copyright regime against the legitimate interests of moral
rights holders and users, is the economic interest of rights holders in pursuing
infringers through civil remedy of the infringement lawsuit so compelling as
to outweigh privacy interests affected by that pursuit?
Is this result consistent with what little explicit guidance there is in legisla-
tion about the relationships between intellectual property rights and personal
data protection legislation? Yes – while the evidence is sparse and indirect.168
It may be noted that s. 32.1(1) of the Copyright Act provides:
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It is not an infringement of copyright for any person
(a) to disclose, pursuant to the Access to Information Act, a record within the
meaning of that Act, or to disclose, pursuant to any like Act of the legisla-
ture of a province, like material;
(b) to disclose, pursuant to the Privacy Act, personal information within the
meaning of that Act, or disclose, pursuant to any like Act of the legislature
of a province, like information...
Nor is prioritizing personal data protection over disclosure for purposes of
copyright litigation inconsistent with the positions of personal data protection
and privacy under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms as compared to the posi-
tion of intellectual property in terms of the Charter. As discussed earlier, infor-
mational privacy is not directly addressed in the Charter, although there are
privacy-related provisions specifically set out in the Charter and jurisprudence
around Charter protection for privacy has developed. The Supreme Court
stated in Lavigne v. Canada that ‘...the Privacy Act has been characterized by
this Court as “quasi-constitutional” because of the role privacy plays in the
preservation of a free and democratic society’.169 In the more recent Heinz case,
Justice Deschamps, writing for herself and Justices Binnie, Fish, and Abella, in
the majority, held that privacy trumps access to government-held information,
and that privacy rights are quasi-constitutional.170 On the other hand, in the
intellectual property context, lower courts had suggested that intellectual prop-
erty was not subject to Charter scrutiny.171 However, in writing for the major-
ity of the Supreme Court in Harvard College v. Canada,172 Justice Bastarache
considered the implications of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
on the issues before the court involving the patentability of the ‘Harvard
Mouse’.173 Although he found the Charter was not helpful in deciding the issue
before the Court, he was certainly prepared to apply the Charter in the context
of intellectual property in an appropriate case.174 And it may also be useful to
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recall that the Supreme Court pointed out in the Heinz case that intellectual
property rights can be altered by contract.175
Therefore, on balance, it appears that the economic interest of rightshold-
ers in pursuing infringers through the civil remedy of the infringement lawsuit
is not so compelling as to outweigh privacy interests affected by that pursuit.
The decision of the Court of Appeal in BMG v. John Doe, while correct in the
result, has left open the door to future litigation. The principles enunciated by
Justice Sexton to guide that future litigation are not appropriate in the current
Canadian context. His concerns with the relationships between intellectual
property and property rights and between privacy and intellectual property
rights are misplaced. The critical factor determining such future cases is the
extension of personal data protection into the private sector in Canada.
Parliament, in creating this environment, has articulated a very narrow scope
for disclosure in terms of personal information and enhanced the confidential-
ity of relationships between individuals and commercial organizations in
Canada. Since privacy is one thrust of personal data protection legislation, and
there is no element of public access connected to the enactment of this legis-
lation in the private sector, legitimate privacy concerns about disclosure have
been dramatically recognized by the enactment of personal data protection
legislation in the private sector in Canada. Whatever the state of the law of
privacy across the various jurisdictions in Canada, the evidence of the enact-
ment of PIPEDA is that ‘public concerns for the protection of intellectual
property rights’ – other than intellectual property rights that lie at the heart of
criminal proceedings – have given way to the public interest in personal data
protection. And, while distinct from privacy, personal data protection is inti-
mately related to privacy and certainly limits disclosure of personal informa-
tion to third parties, rather than encouraging it. Thus, as intimated in the Tariff
22 decision, and consistent with Canada’s international obligations, individu-
als confiding personal information to commercial organizations in Canada
should be entitled to have those private confidences of personal information
respected by the courts, whatever the civil litigation interests of third parties
might be.
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